A Linked-List Approach to Cryptographically Secure Elections Using Instant Runoff Voting

  • Jason Keller
  • Joe Kilian
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5350)


Numerous methods have been proposed to conduct cryptographically secure elections. Most of these protocols focus on 1-out-of-n voting schemes. Few protocols have been devised for preferential voting systems, in which voters provide a list of rankings of the candidates, and many of those treat ballots as if they were ballots in a 1-out-of-n voting scheme. We propose a linked-list-based scheme that provides improved privacy over current schemes, hiding voter preferences that should not be revealed. For large lists of candidates we achieve improved asymptotic performance.


Electronic Voting Secure Computation 


  1. 1.
    Aditya, R., Boyd, C., Dawson, E., Viswanathan, K.: Secure e-voting for preferential elections. In: Traunmüller, R. (ed.) EGOV 2003. LNCS, vol. 2739, pp. 246–249. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Baudron, O., Fouque, P.-A., Pointcheval, D., Stern, J., Poupard, G.: Practical multi-candidate election system. In: PODC 2001: Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pp. 274–283. ACM Press, New York (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt-free secret-ballot elections (extended abstract). In: STOC 1994: Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 544–553. ACM, New York (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Benaloh, J.C., Yung, M.: Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters. In: PODC 1986: Proceedings of the fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pp. 52–62. ACM, New York (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Yao, A.C.: How to generate and exchange secrets. In: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 162–167 (1986)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Canetti, R., Gennaro, R.: Incoercible multiparty computation (extended abstract). In: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 504–513 (1996)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24, 84–88 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Cramer, R., Damgård, I., Schoenmakers, B.: Proofs of partial knowledge and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 174–187. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Cramer, R., Gennaro, R., Schoenmakers, B.: A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 103–118. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Desmedt, Y.G., Frankel, Y.: Threshold cryptosystems. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 307–315. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Furukawa, J., Sako, K.: An efficient scheme for proving a shuffle. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 368–387. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Gennaro, R.: Achieving independence efficiently and securely. In: PODC 1995: Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pp. 130–136. ACM Press, New York (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game. In: STOC 1987: Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM conference on Theory of computing, pp. 218–229. ACM, New York (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Hevia, A., Kiwi, M.: Electronic jury voting protocols. Theor. Comput. Sci. 321(1), 73–94 (2004)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
  17. 17.
  18. 18.
  19. 19.
    Jakobsson, M., Juels, A.: Addition of elgamal plaintexts. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 346–358. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: WPES 2005: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, pp. 61–70. ACM, New York (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Kiayias, A., Yung, M.: The vector-ballot e-voting approach. In: Juels, A. (ed.) FC 2004. LNCS, vol. 3110, pp. 72–89. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Neff, C.A.: A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In: CCS 2001: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 116–125. ACM Press, New York (2001)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Peng, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E.: Simple and efficient shuffling with provable correctness and zk privacy. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 188–204. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Receipt-free mix-typc voting scheme-a practical solution to the implementation of a voting booth. In: Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1995. LNCS, vol. 921, pp. 393–403. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Commun. ACM 22(11), 612–613 (1979)MathSciNetCrossRefMATHGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Wikstrom, D.: A universally composable mix-net (2004)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jason Keller
    • 1
  • Joe Kilian
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceRutgers UniversityPiscatawayUSA

Personalised recommendations