Using Dependent CORAS Diagrams to Analyse Mutual Dependency

  • Gyrd Brændeland
  • Heidi E. I. Dahl
  • Iselin Engan
  • Ketil Stølen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5141)

Abstract

The CORAS method for security risk analysis provides a customized language, the CORAS diagrams, for threat and risk modelling. In this paper, we extend this language to capture context dependencies, and use it as a means to analyse mutual dependency. We refer to the extension as dependent CORAS diagrams. We define a textual syntax using EBNF and explain how a dependent CORAS diagram may be schematically translated via the textual syntax into a paragraph in English, characterizing its intended meaning. Then we demonstrate the suitability of the language by means of a core example.

Keywords

Predicate Logic Fault Tree Analysis Misuse Case Deduction Rule Fault Tree Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gyrd Brændeland
    • 1
    • 2
  • Heidi E. I. Dahl
    • 1
  • Iselin Engan
    • 1
  • Ketil Stølen
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.SINTEF ICTOsloNorway
  2. 2.Department of InformaticsUiOOsloNorway

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