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Cryptanalysis of Vo-Kim Forward Secure Signature in ICISC 2005

  • Jia Yu
  • Fanyu Kong
  • Xiangguo Cheng
  • Rong Hao
  • Guowen Li
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5324)

Abstract

D. L. Vo and K. Kim proposed a forward secure signature scheme from bilinear pairings in annual International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology 2005. They claimed that their scheme satisfies several merits including requiring the general security parameters only independent to the total number of time periods and performing key evolving for unlimited time periods while maintaining sizes of keys and signature fixed. They also claimed this scheme is forward secure under the assumption of computational Diffie-Hellman problem. In this paper, we analyze the security of this scheme and point out this scheme doesn’t satisfy the forward security.

Keywords

forward security digital signature provable security key exposure 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jia Yu
    • 1
  • Fanyu Kong
    • 2
  • Xiangguo Cheng
    • 1
  • Rong Hao
    • 1
  • Guowen Li
    • 3
  1. 1.College of Information EngineeringQingdao UniversityQingdaoChina
  2. 2.Institute of Network SecurityShandong UniversityJinanChina
  3. 3.School of Computer Science and TechnologyShandong Jianzhu UniversityJinanChina

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