Side Channels in the McEliece PKC

  • Falko Strenzke
  • Erik Tews
  • H. Gregor Molter
  • Raphael Overbeck
  • Abdulhadi Shoufan
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-88403-3_15

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5299)
Cite this paper as:
Strenzke F., Tews E., Molter H.G., Overbeck R., Shoufan A. (2008) Side Channels in the McEliece PKC. In: Buchmann J., Ding J. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5299. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

The McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC) is regarded as secure in the presence of quantum computers because no efficient quantum algorithm is known for the underlying problems, which this cryptosystem is built upon. As we show in this paper, a straightforward implementation of this system may feature several side channels. Specifically, we present a Timing Attack which was executed successfully against a software implementation of the McEliece PKC. Furthermore, the critical system components for key generation and decryption are inspected to identify channels enabling power and cache attacks. Implementation aspects are proposed as countermeasures to face these attacks.

Keywords

side channel attack timing attack post quantum cryptography 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Falko Strenzke
    • 1
  • Erik Tews
    • 2
  • H. Gregor Molter
    • 3
  • Raphael Overbeck
    • 4
  • Abdulhadi Shoufan
    • 3
  1. 1.FlexSecure GmbHGermany
  2. 2.Cryptography and Computeralgebra, Department of Computer ScienceTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany
  3. 3.Integrated Circuits and Systems Lab, Department of Computer ScienceTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany
  4. 4.Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de LausanneSwitzerland

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