Remote Integrity Check with Dishonest Storage Server

  • Ee-Chien Chang
  • Jia Xu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5283)

Abstract

We are interested in this problem: a verifier, with a small and reliable storage, wants to periodically check whether a remote server is keeping a large file x. A dishonest server, by adapting the challenges and responses, tries to discard partial information of x and yet evades detection. Besides the security requirements, there are considerations on communication, storage size and computation time. Juels et al. [10] gave a security model for Proof of Retrievability (\(\mathcal{POR}\)) system. The model imposes a requirement that the original x can be recovered from multiple challenges-responses. Such requirement is not necessary in our problem. Hence, we propose an alternative security model for Remote Integrity Check (\(\mathcal{RIC}\)). We study a few schemes and analyze their efficiency and security. In particular, we prove the security of a proposed scheme HENC. This scheme can be deployed as a \(\mathcal{POR}\) system and it also serves as an example of an effective \(\mathcal{POR}\) system whose “extraction” is not verifiable. We also propose a combination of the RSA-based scheme by Filho et al. [7] and the ECC-based authenticator by Naor et al. [12], which achieves good asymptotic performance. This scheme is not a \(\mathcal{POR}\) system and seems to be a secure \(\mathcal{RIC}\). In-so-far, all schemes that have been proven secure can also be adopted as \(\mathcal{POR}\) systems. This brings out the question of whether there are fundamental differences between the two models. To highlight the differences, we introduce a notion, trap-door compression, that captures a property on compressibility.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ee-Chien Chang
    • 1
  • Jia Xu
    • 1
  1. 1.School of ComputingNational University of SingaporeSingapore

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