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Unguessable Atoms: A Logical Foundation for Security

  • Mark Bickford
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5295)

Abstract

We show how a type of atoms, which behave like urelements, and a new proposition that expresses the independence of a term from an atom can be added to any logical system after imposing minor restrictions on definitions and computations. Working in constructive type theory, we give rules for the independence proposition and show how cryptographic protocols can be modeled as automata exchanging atoms. This model provides a unifying framework for reasoning about security and allows us to combine a general model of computation with a simple model of acquisition of secret information. As an application, we prove a fundamental property of nonces that justifies the axioms for nonces used in the protocol composition logic (PCL) of Datta, Derek, Mitchell and Roy. The example shows that basic security properties are naturally expressed in terms of independence and the causal ordering of events. The rules and example proofs are fully implemented in the Nuprl proof development system.

Keywords

Computation System Symbolic Model Cryptographic Protocol Logical Foundation Virtual Server 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Bickford
    • 1
  1. 1.ATC-NY and Cornell University Computer ScienceIthacaUSA

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