A Fair Mechanism for Recurrent Multi-unit Auctions

  • Javier Murillo
  • Víctor Muñoz
  • Beatriz López
  • Dídac Busquets
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5244)


Auctions are a good tool for dealing with resource allocation in multi-agent environments. When the resources are either renewable or perishable, a repeated auction mechanism is needed, in what is known as recurrent auctions. However, several problems arise with this kind of auction, namely, the resource waste problem, the bidder drop problem, and the asymmetric balance of negotiation power. In this paper we present different mechanisms to deal with these issues. We have evaluated the mechanisms in a network bandwidth allocation scenario, and the results show that the proposed mechanisms achieve higher benefits for the auctioneer, while also providing a fairer behavior.


Reservation Price Bidding Price Wealth Distribution Combinatorial Auction Auction Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Javier Murillo
    • 1
  • Víctor Muñoz
    • 1
  • Beatriz López
    • 1
  • Dídac Busquets
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut d’Informàtica i AplicacionsGirona

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