Justification Logic offers a new approach to a theory of knowledge, belief, and evidence, which possesses the potential to have significant impact on applications. The celebrated account of knowledge as justified true belief, which is attributed to Plato, has long been a focus of epistemic studies (cf. [10,15,18,26,30,32] and many others).


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sergei Artemov
    • 1
  1. 1.CUNY Graduate CenterNew York CityUSA

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