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Bargaining Power in Electronic Negotiations: A Bilateral Negotiation Mechanism

  • Ricardo Buettner
  • Stefan Kirn
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5183)

Abstract

Bargaining power has a major influence in negotiations. Up to now, a lot of electronic negotiation models have been developed and manifold negotiation challenges have been already addressed, but mainly related to the structure and the process of the negotiation. However, research concerning bargaining power is still inadequate represented. Thus, in order to contribute to the state of the art of electronic negotiations, this paper shows a bilateral automated negotiation mechanism that considers bargaining power.

Keywords

Bargaining Power Multiagent System Reservation Price Bidding Strategy Buyer Agent 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ricardo Buettner
    • 1
  • Stefan Kirn
    • 2
  1. 1.Fachhochschule fuer Oekonomie & ManagementUniversity of Applied SciencesMuenchenGermany
  2. 2.Information Systems IIUniversity of HohenheimStuttgartGermany

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