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Architecting Dependable and Secure Systems Using Virtualization

  • Bernhard Jansen
  • HariGovind V. Ramasamy
  • Matthias Schunter
  • Axel Tanner
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5135)

Abstract

We outline ways of leveraging virtualization for enhancing system dependability and security, and describe the practical realization of some of these enhancements using the Xen open-source virtual machine monitor (VMM). Using combinatorial modeling, we perform reliability analysis of multiple design choices when a single physical server is used to host multiple virtual servers. The analysis shows that unless certain conditions (e.g., regarding the number of virtual servers) are met, virtualization could decrease the reliability of a single physical server. The analysis also shows that improving the reliability of the VMM is crucial to improving the reliability of a virtualized physical node. Motivated by this observation, we show how the enhancements we have implemented can be combined to produce a more reliable Xen VMM architecture, called R-Xen. The Xen VMM consists of a hypervisor core and a privileged virtual machine (VM) called Dom0. Dom0, being much bulkier than the hypervisor core, is the weak link for Xen reliability. Consequently, R-Xen focuses on improving the reliability of Dom0 through replication in which Dom0 replicas mutually monitor each other for intrusion and faults. R-Xen converts more severe Dom0 replica faults into fail-stop behavior, and rejuvenates a failed replica. The approach is transparent and does not require any modifications to regular Xen VMs (user domains).

Keywords

Virtual Machine Intrusion Detection System Call Kernel Module Physical Node 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bernhard Jansen
    • 1
  • HariGovind V. Ramasamy
    • 2
  • Matthias Schunter
    • 1
  • Axel Tanner
    • 1
  1. 1.IBM Zurich Research LaboratoryRüschlikonSwitzerland
  2. 2.IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, HawthorneNew YorkUSA

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