Distributed Norm Enforcement: Ostracism in Open Multi-Agent Systems

  • Adrian Perreau de Pinninck
  • Carles Sierra
  • Marco Schorlemmer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4884)


Enforcement in normative agent societies is a complex issue, which becomes more problematic as these societies become more decentralized and open. A new distributed mechanism is presented to enforce norms by ostracizing agents that do not abide by them in their interactions with other agents in the society. Simulations are run to check the mechanism’s impact in different types of societies. The simulations have shown that complete ostracism is not always possible, but the mechanism substantially reduces the number of norm violations.


Multiagent System Interaction Initiator Norm Violation Norm Supporter Mediator Agent 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adrian Perreau de Pinninck
    • 1
  • Carles Sierra
    • 1
  • Marco Schorlemmer
    • 1
  1. 1.IIIA – Artificial Intelligence Research InstituteCSIC – Spanish National Research CouncilBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain

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