Voronoi Games on Cycle Graphs

  • Marios Mavronicolas
  • Burkhard Monien
  • Vicky G. Papadopoulou
  • Florian Schoppmann
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5162)


In a Voronoi game, each of a finite number of players chooses a point in some metric space. The utility of a player is the total measure of all points that are closer to him than to any other player, where points equidistant to several players are split up evenly among the closest players. In a recent paper, Dürr and Thang (2007) considered discrete Voronoi games on graphs, with a particular focus on pure Nash equilibria. They also looked at Voronoi games on cycle graphs with n nodes and k players. In this paper, we prove a new characterization of all Nash equilibria for these games. We then use this result to establish that Nash equilibria exist if and only if \(k \leq \frac{2n}3\) or k ≥ n. Finally, we give exact bounds of \(\frac 94\) and 1 for the prices of anarchy and stability, respectively.


Nash Equilibrium Social Cost Pure Nash Equilibrium Minimum Utility Competitive Location 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marios Mavronicolas
    • 1
  • Burkhard Monien
    • 2
  • Vicky G. Papadopoulou
    • 1
  • Florian Schoppmann
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of CyprusNicosiaCyprus
  2. 2.Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and MathematicsUniversity of PaderbornPaderbornGermany
  3. 3.International Graduate School of Dynamic Intelligent Systems 

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