Message Quality for Ambient System Security

  • Ciarán Bryce
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5198)

Abstract

In ambient systems, a principal may be a physical object whose identity does not convey useful information for taking security decisions. Thus, establishing a trusted channel with a device depends more on the device being able to demonstrate what is does, rather than who it is. This paper proposes a security model that allows a principal to establish the intent of an adversary and to make the adversary prove its trustworthiness by furnishing proof of current and past behavior.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ciarán Bryce
    • 1
  1. 1.INRIA-RennesFrance

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