Founding Cryptography on Oblivious Transfer – Efficiently

  • Yuval Ishai
  • Manoj Prabhakaran
  • Amit Sahai
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_32

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5157)
Cite this paper as:
Ishai Y., Prabhakaran M., Sahai A. (2008) Founding Cryptography on Oblivious Transfer – Efficiently. In: Wagner D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2008. CRYPTO 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5157. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We present a simple and efficient compiler for transforming secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols that enjoy security only with an honest majority into MPC protocols that guarantee security with no honest majority, in the oblivious-transfer (OT) hybrid model. Our technique works by combining a secure protocol in the honest majority setting with a protocol achieving only security against semi-honest parties in the setting of no honest majority.

Applying our compiler to variants of protocols from the literature, we get several applications for secure two-party computation and for MPC with no honest majority. These include:

  • Constant-rate two-party computation in the OT-hybrid model. We obtain a statistically UC-secure two-party protocol in the OT-hybrid model that can evaluate a general circuit C of size s and depth d with a total communication complexity of O(s) + poly(k, d, log s) and O(d) rounds. The above result generalizes to a constant number of parties.

  • Extending OTs in the malicious model. We obtain a computationally efficient protocol for generating many string OTs from few string OTs with only a constant amortized communication overhead compared to the total length of the string OTs.

  • Black-box constructions for constant-round MPC with no honest majority. We obtain general computationally UC-secure MPC protocols in the OT-hybrid model that use only a constant number of rounds, and only make a black-box access to a pseudorandom generator. This gives the first constant-round protocols for three or more parties that only make a black-box use of cryptographic primitives (and avoid expensive zero-knowledge proofs).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuval Ishai
    • 1
  • Manoj Prabhakaran
    • 2
  • Amit Sahai
    • 3
  1. 1.Technion, Israel and University of CaliforniaLos Angeles 
  2. 2.University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
  3. 3.University of CaliforniaLos Angeles 

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