Bug Attacks

  • Eli Biham
  • Yaniv Carmeli
  • Adi Shamir
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5157)

Abstract

In this paper we present a new kind of cryptanalytic attack which utilizes bugs in the hardware implementation of computer instructions. The best known example of such a bug is the Intel division bug, which resulted in slightly inaccurate results for extremely rare inputs. Whereas in most applications such bugs can be viewed as a minor nuisance, we show that in the case of RSA (even when protected by OAEP), Pohlig-Hellman, elliptic curve cryptography, and several other schemes, such bugs can be a security disaster: Decrypting ciphertexts on any computer which multiplies even one pair of numbers incorrectly can lead to full leakage of the secret key, sometimes with a single well-chosen ciphertext.

Keywords

Bug attack Fault attack RSA Pohlig-Hellman ECC 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eli Biham
    • 1
  • Yaniv Carmeli
    • 1
  • Adi Shamir
    • 2
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentTechnion - Israel Institute of TechnologyHaifaIsrael
  2. 2.Computer Science DepartmentThe Weizmann Institute of ScienceRehovotIsrael

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