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Studying Viable Free Markets in Peer-to-Peer File Exchange Applications without Altruistic Agents

  • David Cabanillas
  • Steven Willmott
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4461)

Abstract

File sharing networks are among the most popular applications of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology to date [1] and have been widely studied in terms of performance, behavior, topology and other properties. A persistent theme throughout this research has been the evidence that many P2P file sharing systems rely on the presence of altruistic users, who provide files, network capacity or some other goods without obvious personal gain and are potentially damaged by the presence of too many free-riders (users who consume resources but do not provide to others in return). In this paper we will explore the use of simple market mechanisms for P2P file sharing which function without the need of altruistic users and consider the conditions under which such markets may be viable.

Keywords

Money Supply Virtual Currency Persistent Theme File Share Network Altruistic Agent 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Cabanillas
    • 1
  • Steven Willmott
    • 1
  1. 1.Software departmentTechnical University of CataloniaBarcelonaSpain

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