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Distributed Norm Enforcement Via Ostracism

  • Adrian Perreau de Pinninck
  • Carles Sierra
  • Marco Schorlemmer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4870)

Abstract

An agent normative society has to deal with two main concerns: how to define norms and how to enforce them. Enforcement becomes a complex issue as agent societies become more decentralized and open. We propose a new distributed mechanism to enforce norms by ostracizing agents that do not abide by them. Our simulations have shown that, although complete ostracism is not always possible, the mechanism substantially reduces the number of norm violations.

Keywords

Multiagent System Norm Violation Social Simulation Mediator Agent Enforcement Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adrian Perreau de Pinninck
    • 1
  • Carles Sierra
    • 1
  • Marco Schorlemmer
    • 1
  1. 1.IIIA – Artificial Intelligence Research Institute CSICSpanish National Research Council Bellaterra(Barcelona)Spain

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