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Iterative Specialisation of Horn Clauses

  • Christoffer Rosenkilde Nielsen
  • Flemming Nielson
  • Hanne Riis Nielson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4960)

Abstract

We present a generic algorithm for solving Horn clauses through iterative specialisation. The algorithm is generic in the sense that it can be instantiated with any decidable fragment of Horn clauses, resulting in a solution scheme for general Horn clauses that guarantees soundness and termination, and furthermore, it presents sufficient criteria for completeness. We then demonstrate the use of the framework, by creating an instance of it, based on the decidable class \({\mathcal{H}_1}\), capable of solving a non-trivial protocol analysis problem based on the Yahalom protocol.

Keywords

Normal Form Iterative Scheme Horn Clause Cryptographic Protocol Ground Term 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christoffer Rosenkilde Nielsen
    • 1
  • Flemming Nielson
    • 1
  • Hanne Riis Nielson
    • 1
  1. 1.Technical University of Denmark 

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