Advertisement

Simulation-Based Analysis of E2E Voting Systems

  • Olivier de Marneffe
  • Olivier Pereira
  • Jean-Jacques Quisquater
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4896)

Abstract

End-to-end auditable voting systems are expected to guarantee very interesting, and often sophisticated security properties, including correctness, privacy, fairness, receipt-freeness, ... However, for many well-known protocols, these properties have never been analyzed in a systematic way. In this paper, we investigate the use of techniques from the simulation-based security tradition for the analysis of these protocols, through a case-study on the ThreeBallot protocol.

Our analysis shows that the ThreeBallot protocol fails to emulate some natural voting functionality, reflecting the lack of election fairness guarantee from this protocol. Guided by the reasons that make our security proof fail, we propose a simple variant of the ThreeBallot protocol and show that this variant emulates our functionality.

Keywords

Vote System Election Outcome Ideal Functionality Ideal World Intermediate System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Fisher, K., Carback, R., Sherman, A.T.: Punchscan: Introduction and System Definition of a High-Integrity Election System. In: Ryan, P. (ed.) IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2006) (2006)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Popoveniuc, S., Hosp, B.: An introduction to punchscan. In: Ryan, P. (ed.) IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2006) (2006)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Chaum, D., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S.A.: A practical, voter-verifiable election scheme. Technical Report CS-TR: 880, School of Computing Science, Newcastle University (2004)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Rivest, R.L., Smith, W.D.: ThreeVotingProtocols: ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin. In: Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (EVT 2007) (2007)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt-free secret-ballot elections. In: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, may 1994, pp. 544–553. ACM Press, New York (1994)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Juels, A., Catalano, D., Jakobsson, M.: Coercion-resistant electronic elections. In: ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, pp. 61–70. ACM Press, New York (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in electronic voting. In: 19th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-19), pp. 28–42. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Moran, T., Naor, M.: Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 373–392. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Groth, J.: Evaluating security of voting schemes in the universal composability framework. In: Jakobsson, M., Yung, M., Zhou, J. (eds.) ACNS 2004. LNCS, vol. 3089, pp. 46–60. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Rivest, R.L.: The ThreeBallot voting system. Accessed on (August 12, 2007) (2006), Available from http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/Rivest-TheThreeBallotVotingSystem.pdf
  11. 11.
    Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rackoff, C.: The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. In: Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 1985), pp. 291–304 (1985)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In: Proceedings of the 19th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 218–229. ACM Press, New York (1987)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Canetti, R.: Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In: Naor, M. (ed.) Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 136–145. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2001), Full version available on http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067 Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M.: A model for asynchronous reactive systems and its application to secure message transmission. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 2001, pp. 184–200. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2001)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Araujo, R., Custodio, R.F., Graaf, J.v.d.: A verifiable voting protocol based on Farnel. In: Benaloh, J. (ed.) IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2007) (2007)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Clark, J., Essex, A., Adams, C.: On the security of ballot receipts in e2e voting systems. In: Benaloh, J. (ed.) IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2007) (2007)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Appel, A.A.: How to defeat rivest’s threeballot voting system. Accessed on August 12, 2007 (2006), Available from http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/DefeatingThreeBallot.pdf
  18. 18.
    Strauss, C.: The trouble with triples. a critical review of the triple ballot (3ballot) scheme. Accessed on August 12, 2007 (2006), Available from http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/Strauss-TroubleWithTriples.pdf
  19. 19.
    Strauss, C.: A critical review of the triple ballot voting system, part2: Cracking the triple ballot encryption. Accessed on August 12, 2007 (2006), Available from http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/Strauss-ThreeBallotCritique2v1.5.pdf
  20. 20.
    Jones, H., Juang, J., Belote, G.: Threeballot in the field. Term paper for MIT course 6.857. Accessed on August 12, 2007 (2006), Available from http://theory.csail.mit.edu/classes/6.857/projects/threeBallotPaper.pdf
  21. 21.
    Henry, K., Stinson, D.R., Sui, J.: The effectiveness of receipt-based attacks on threeballot. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2007/287 (2007), http://eprint.iacr.org/

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olivier de Marneffe
    • 1
  • Olivier Pereira
    • 1
  • Jean-Jacques Quisquater
    • 1
  1. 1.Crypto Group – Université catholique de Louvain 

Personalised recommendations