Bingo Voting: Secure and Coercion-Free Voting Using a Trusted Random Number Generator

  • Jens-Matthias Bohli
  • Jörn Müller-Quade
  • Stefan Röhrich
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4896)

Abstract

It is debatable if current direct-recording electronic voting machines can sufficiently be trusted for a use in elections. Reports about malfunctions and possible ways of manipulation abound. Voting schemes have to fulfill seemingly contradictory requirements: On one hand the election process should be verifiable to prevent electoral fraud and on the other hand each vote should be deniable to avoid coercion and vote buying.

This work presents a new verifiable and coercion-free voting scheme Bingo Voting, which is based on a trusted random number generator. As a motivation for the new scheme two coercion/vote buying attacks on voting schemes are presented which show that it can be dangerous to let the voter contribute randomness to the voting scheme.

A proof-of-concept implementation of the scheme shows the practicality of the scheme: all costly computations can be moved to a non time critical pre-voting phase.

Keywords

Secure electronic voting coercion-free receipt-free 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jens-Matthias Bohli
    • 1
  • Jörn Müller-Quade
    • 2
  • Stefan Röhrich
    • 2
  1. 1.Network Research DivisionNEC Laboratories EuropeHeidelbergGermany
  2. 2.Institut für Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme / E.I.S.S.Universität Karlsruhe (TH)Germany

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