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Detection and Diagnosis of Control Interception

  • Chang-Hsien Tsai
  • Shih-Kun Huang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4861)

Abstract

Crash implies that a software is unstable and possibly vulnerable. Stack overflow is one of many causes of crashes. This kind of bug is often hard to debug because of the corrupted stack, so that debuggers cannot trace the control flow of the programs. A control-type crash caused by stack overflow is easy to be developed as a control interception attack. We develop a method to locate this attack and implement it as a plug-in of Valgrind [1]. This tool can be used in the honeypot to detect and diagnose zero-day exploits. We use it to detect several vulnerabilities and automatically locate the bugs.

Keywords

Return Address Malicious Code Stack Overflow Control Corruption USENIX Security Symposium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chang-Hsien Tsai
    • 1
  • Shih-Kun Huang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, National Chiao Tung UniversityTaiwan

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