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Computational Semantics for Basic Protocol Logic – A Stochastic Approach

  • Gergei Bana
  • Koji Hasebe
  • Mitsuhiro Okada
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4846)

Abstract

This paper relates formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. Instead of the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [7] , but the technique is suitable for extensions to more complex situations such as PCL. We make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence are able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence.

Keywords

cryptographic protocols formal methods first order logic computational semantics 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gergei Bana
    • 1
  • Koji Hasebe
    • 2
  • Mitsuhiro Okada
    • 3
  1. 1.Dept of Mathematics, Tulane University, New Orleans, LAUSA
  2. 2.Research Center for Verification and Semantics, AIST, OsakaJapan
  3. 3.Department of Philosophy, Keio University, TokyoJapan

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