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Authenticated Key Exchange and Key Encapsulation in the Standard Model

  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4833)

Abstract

This paper introduces a new paradigm to realize various types of cryptographic primitives such as authenticated key exchange and key encapsulation in the standard model under three standard assumptions: the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, target collision resistant (TCR) hash functions and pseudo-random functions (PRFs). We propose the first (PKI-based) two-pass authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol that is comparably as efficient as the existing most efficient protocols like MQV and that is secure in the standard model (under these standard assumptions), while the existing efficient two-pass AKE protocols such as HMQV, NAXOS and CMQV are secure in the random oracle model. Our protocol is shown to be secure in the (currently) strongest security definition, the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security definition introduced by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin. This paper also proposes a CCA-secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) under these assumptions, which is almost as efficient as the Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM. This scheme is also secure in a stronger security notion, the chosen public-key and ciphertext attack (CPCA) security. The proposed schemes in this paper are redundancy-free (or validity-check-free) and the implication is that combining them with redundancy-free symmetric encryption (DEM) will yield redundancy-free (e.g., MAC-free) CCA-secure hybrid encryption.

Keywords

Hash Function Random Oracle Model Decryption Oracle Adaptive Choose Ciphertext Attack Hash Function Family 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tatsuaki Okamoto
    • 1
  1. 1.NTTJapan

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