Two Notes on the Security of Certificateless Signatures

  • Rafael Castro
  • Ricardo Dahab
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-75670-5_6

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4784)
Cite this paper as:
Castro R., Dahab R. (2007) Two Notes on the Security of Certificateless Signatures. In: Susilo W., Liu J.K., Mu Y. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4784. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We discuss two common pitfalls found in proofs of security of various certificateless signature (CLS) schemes. As a result of the first observation, we are able to show that a CLS scheme ([Goy06]), previously thought to be secure, is vulnerable to a key replacement attack. We then proceed to define a class of CLS schemes whose security is provable by standard techniques, leading to a more efficient version of a known CLS scheme ([ARP03]) and a (previously unknown) security proof for another ([LCS05]).

Keywords

Certificateless Public-Key Cryptography Forking Lemma Signature Schemes 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rafael Castro
    • 1
  • Ricardo Dahab
    • 1
  1. 1.UNICAMPBrazil

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