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CCA2-Secure Threshold Broadcast Encryption with Shorter Ciphertexts

  • Vanesa Daza
  • Javier Herranz
  • Paz Morillo
  • Carla Ràfols
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4784)

Abstract

In a threshold broadcast encryption scheme, a sender chooses (ad-hoc) a set of n receivers and a threshold t, and then encrypts a message by using the public keys of all the receivers, in such a way that the original plaintext can be recovered only if at least t receivers cooperate. Previously proposed threshold broadcast encryption schemes have ciphertexts whose length is at least \(n + \mathcal{O}(1)\). In this paper, we propose new schemes, for both PKI and identity-based scenarios, where the ciphertexts’ length is \(n-t + \mathcal{O}(1)\). The constructions use secret sharing techniques and the Canetti-Halevi-Katz transformation to achieve chosen-ciphertext security. The security of our schemes is formally proved under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption.

Keywords

Secret Sharing Scheme Bilinear Pairing Broadcast Encryption Challenge Ciphertext Choose Ciphertext Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vanesa Daza
    • 1
  • Javier Herranz
    • 2
  • Paz Morillo
    • 3
  • Carla Ràfols
    • 3
  1. 1.Dept. D’Enginyeria Informàtica i Matemàtiques, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Av. Països Catalans 26, E-43007 TarragonaSpain
  2. 2.IIIA, Artificial Intelligence Research Institute, CSIC, Spanish National Research Council, Campus UAB s/n, E-08193 BellaterraSpain
  3. 3.Dept. Matemàtica Aplicada IV, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, C. Jordi Girona 1-3, E-08034 BarcelonaSpain

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