An Approach for Symmetric Encryption Against Side Channel Attacks in Provable Security

  • Wei Li
  • Dawu Gu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4784)


This paper defines perfect security against side channel attacks for a cryptosystem implementation, and discusses the implication of secure notions for a cryptosystem in provable security. Then we give some security notions for symmetric encryption against side channel attacks, UB-SCA (unbreakability in side channel attacks) and IND-CPA-SCA (indistinguishability of chosen plaintext attacks and side channel attacks). On the basis of these definitions, we propose and prove that IND-CPA + UB-SCA \(\Rightarrow\) IND-CPA-SCA by reduction, and IND-CPA-SCA is stronger than IND-CPA or UB-SCA.


Random String Symmetric Encryption Side Channel Attack Provable Security Oracle Query 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wei Li
    • 1
  • Dawu Gu
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240China

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