Verifiable Internet Voting Solving Secure Platform Problem

  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
  • Filip Zagórski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4752)

Abstract

We present a voter verifiable Internet voting scheme which provides anonymity and eliminates the danger of vote selling even if the computer used by the voter cannot be fully trusted. The ballots cast remain anonymous - even the machine does not know the choice of the voter. It makes no sense to buy votes - the voter can cheat the buyer even if his machine cooperates with the buyer. Nevertheless, the voter can verity that his vote has been counted.

Keywords

electronic voting vote selling coercion resistance anonymity 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
    • 1
  • Filip Zagórski
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology 

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