Formalizing and Analyzing Sender Invariance

  • Paul Hankes Drielsma
  • Sebastian Mödersheim
  • Luca Viganò
  • David Basin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4691)

Abstract

In many network applications and services, agents that share no secure channel in advance may still wish to communicate securely with each other. In such settings, one often settles for achieving security goals weaker than authentication, such as sender invariance. Informally, sender invariance means that all messages that seem to come from the same source actually do, where the source can perhaps only be identified by a pseudonym. This implies, in particular, that the relevant parts of messages cannot be modified by an intruder.

In this paper, we provide the first formal definition of sender invariance as well as a stronger security goal that we call strong sender invariance. We show that both kinds of sender invariance are closely related to, and entailed by, weak authentication, the primary difference being that sender invariance is designed for the context where agents can only be identified pseudonymously. In addition to clarifying how sender invariance and authentication are related, this result shows how a broad class of automated tools can be used for the analysis of sender invariance protocols. As a case study, we describe the analysis of two sender invariance protocols using the OFMC back-end of the AVISPA Tool.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Abadi, M.: Private Authentication. In: Dingledine, R., Syverson, P.F. (eds.) PET 2002. LNCS, vol. 2482, pp. 27–40. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., Nikander, P.: RFC3971 – SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) (March 2005)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Armando, A., Basin, D., Boichut, Y., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J., Hankes Drielsma, P., Heàm, P.C., Mantovani, J., Moedersheim, S., von Oheimb, D., Rusinowitch, M., Santiago, J., Turuani, M., Viganò, L., Vigneron, L.: The AVISPA Tool for the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications. In: Etessami, K., Rajamani, S.K. (eds.) CAV 2005. LNCS, vol. 3576, pp. 281–285. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Aura, T.: RFC3972 – Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) (March 2005)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: Constraint Differentiation: A New Reduction Technique for Constraint-Based Analysis of Security Protocols. In: CCS 2003. Proceedings of CCS’03, pp. 335–344. ACM Press, New York (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: Algebraic intruder deductions. In: Sutcliffe, G., Voronkov, A. (eds.) LPAR 2005. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3835, pp. 549–564. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Basin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: OFMC: A Symbolic Model-Checker for Security Protocols. International Journal of Information Security 4(3), 181–208 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity authentication and key distribution. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232–249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Boyd, C.: Security architectures using formal methods. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 11(5), 694–701 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Bradner, S., Mankin, A., Schiller, J.I.: A framework for purpose built keys (PBK), Work in Progress (Internet Draft) (June 2003)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J., Hankes Drielsma, P., Mantovani, J., Mödersheim, S., Vigneron, L.: A High Level Protocol Specification Language for Industrial Security-Sensitive Protocols. In: Proceedings of SAPS 2004, pp. 193–205. Austrian Computer Society (2004)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Dierks, T., Allen, C.: RFC2246 – The TLS Protocol Version 1 (January 1999)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Dolev, D., Yao, A.: On the Security of Public-Key Protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 2(29) (1983)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Gollmann, D.: What do we mean by Entity Authentication. In: Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 46–54. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (1996)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Johnson, D., Perkins, C., Arkko, J.: RFC3775 – Mobility Support in IPv6 (June 2004)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Lowe, G.: A hierarchy of authentication specifications. Proceedings of CSFW 1997, pp. 31–43. IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (1997)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Nikander, P., Kempf, J., Nordmark, E.: RFC3756 – IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats (May 2004)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Hankes Drielsma
    • 1
  • Sebastian Mödersheim
    • 1
  • Luca Viganò
    • 1
  • David Basin
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security Group, Dep. of Computer Science, ETH ZurichSwitzerland

Personalised recommendations