Strategic Games on Defense Trees

  • Stefano Bistarelli
  • Marco Dall’Aglio
  • Pamela Peretti
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4691)


In this paper we use defense trees, an extension of attack trees with countermeasures, to represent attack scenarios and game theory to detect the most promising actions attacker and defender. On one side the attacker wants to break the system (with as little efforts as possible), on the opposite side the defender want to protect it (sustaining the minimum cost).

As utility function for the attacker and for the defender we consider economic indexes (like the Return on Investment (ROI) and the Return on Attack (ROA)). We show how our approach can be used to evaluate effectiveness and economic profitability of countermeasures as well as their deterrent effect on attackers, thus providing decision makers with a useful tool for performing better evaluation of IT security investments during the risk management process.


Security Risk Analysis Game Theory 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefano Bistarelli
    • 1
    • 2
  • Marco Dall’Aglio
    • 1
  • Pamela Peretti
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Scienze, Università degli Studi “G. d’Annunzio”, PescaraItaly
  2. 2.Istituto di Informatica e Telematica, CNR, PisaItaly

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