Evaluation of the Masked Logic Style MDPL on a Prototype Chip

  • Thomas Popp
  • Mario Kirschbaum
  • Thomas Zefferer
  • Stefan Mangard
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4727)


MDPL has been proposed as a masked logic style that counteracts DPA attacks. Recently, it has been shown that the so-called “early propagation effect” might reduce the security of this logic style significantly. In the light of these findings, a 0.13 μm prototype chip that includes the implementation of an 8051-compatible microcontroller in MDPL has been analyzed. Attacks on the measured power traces of this implementation show a severe DPA leakage. In this paper, the results of a detailed analysis of the reasons for this leakage are presented. Furthermore, a proposal is made on how to improve MDPL with respect to the identified problems.


DPA-Resistant Logic Styles Masked Logic Dual-Rail Precharge Logic Early Propagation Effect Improved MDPL Prototype Chip 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Popp
    • 1
  • Mario Kirschbaum
    • 1
  • Thomas Zefferer
    • 1
  • Stefan Mangard
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University of Technology, Inffeldgasse 16a, 8010 GrazAustria
  2. 2.Infineon Technologies AG, Security Innovation, Am Campeon 1-12, 85579 NeubibergGermany

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