Selfish Load Balancing Under Partial Knowledge

  • Elias Koutsoupias
  • Panagiota N. Panagopoulou
  • Paul G. Spirakis
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-74456-6_54

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4708)
Cite this paper as:
Koutsoupias E., Panagopoulou P.N., Spirakis P.G. (2007) Selfish Load Balancing Under Partial Knowledge. In: Kučera L., Kučera A. (eds) Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2007. MFCS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4708. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We consider n selfish agents or players, each having a load, who want to place their loads to one of two bins. The agents have an incomplete picture of the world: They know some loads exactly and only a probability distribution for the rest. We study Nash equilibria for this model, we compute the Price of Anarchy for some cases and show that sometimes extra information adversely affects the Divergence Ratio (a kind of subjective Price of Anarchy).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elias Koutsoupias
    • 1
  • Panagiota N. Panagopoulou
    • 2
    • 3
  • Paul G. Spirakis
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, University of AthensGreece
  2. 2.Computer Engineering and Informatics Department, Patras UniversityGreece
  3. 3.Research Academic Computer Technology InstituteGreece

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