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SORMA – Building an Open Grid Market for Grid Resource Allocation

  • Dirk Neumann
  • Jochen Stoesser
  • Arun Anandasivam
  • Nikolay Borissov
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4685)

Abstract

The demand for computing and storage resources in a Grid network increases in both academic and industrial application domains. Participants in a network (i.e. companies or research institutes) try to selfishly maximize their individual benefit from participating in the Grid. Setting the right incentives for suppliers and requesters for an efficient usage of the limited Grid resources will motivate the participants to cooperate and provide their idle resources. In this paper we present an economic approach for efficient resource allocation. A market mechanism called Decentralized Local Greedy Mechanism [2] satisfies desirable economic properties and thus is deemed promising to enable an efficient allocation of Grid resources.

Keywords

Self-Organizing ICT Resource Management Open Grid Market Grid Resource Allocation 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dirk Neumann
    • 1
  • Jochen Stoesser
    • 1
  • Arun Anandasivam
    • 1
  • Nikolay Borissov
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Information Systems and Management (IISM), Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Englerstr. 14, 76131 KarlsruheGermany

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