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Full Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MD4 and NMAC-MD5

  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
  • Gaëtan Leurent
  • Phong Q. Nguyen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4622)

Abstract

At Crypto ’06, Bellare presented new security proofs for HMAC and NMAC, under the assumption that the underlying compression function is a pseudo-random function family. Conversely, at Asiacrypt ’06, Contini and Yin used collision techniques to obtain forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC instantiated with MD4, MD5, SHA-0 and reduced SHA-1. In this paper, we present the first full key-recovery attacks on NMAC and HMAC instantiated with a real-life hash function, namely MD4. Our main result is an attack on HMAC/NMAC-MD4 which recovers the full MAC secret key after roughly 288 MAC queries and 295 MD4 computations. We also extend the partial key-recovery Contini-Yin attack on NMAC-MD5 (in the related-key setting) to a full key-recovery attack. The attacks are based on generalizations of collision attacks to recover a secret IV, using new differential paths for MD4.

Keywords

NMAC HMAC key-recovery MD4 MD5 collisions differential path 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierre-Alain Fouque
    • 1
  • Gaëtan Leurent
    • 1
  • Phong Q. Nguyen
    • 1
  1. 1.École Normale Supérieure – Département d’Informatique, 45 rue d’Ulm, 75230 Paris Cedex 05France

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