COCOA 2007: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications pp 136-145 | Cite as
Communication Leading to Nash Equilibrium Through Robust Messages – S5-Knowledge Model Case –
Abstract
A communication process in the S5-knowledge model is presented which leads to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game through robust messages. In the communication process each player predicts the other players’ actions under his/her private information. The players communicate privately their conjectures through message according to the communication graph, where each recipient of the message learns and revises his/her conjecture. The emphasis is on that each player sends not exact information about his/her individual conjecture but robust information about the conjectures to an accuracy ε.
AMS 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 91A35, Secondary 03B45.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C62, C78.
Keywords
Communication Robust message Nash equilibrium Protocol Conjecture Non-corporative game S5-knowledge modelPreview
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