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A Scalable and Secure Cryptographic Service

  • Shouhuai Xu
  • Ravi Sandhu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4602)

Abstract

In this paper we present the design of a scalable and secure cryptographic service that can be adopted to support large-scale networked systems, which may require strong authentication from a large population of users. Since the users may not be able to adequately protect their cryptographic credentials, our service leverages some better protected servers to help fulfill such authentication needs. Compared with previous proposals, our service has the following features: (1) it incorporates a 3-factor authentication mechanism, which facilitates compromise detection; (2) it supports immediate revocation of a cryptographic functionality in question; (3) the damage due to the compromise of a server is contained; (4) it is scalable and highly available.

Keywords

cryptographic service scalability security compromise detection compromise confinement availability 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shouhuai Xu
    • 1
  • Ravi Sandhu
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at San AntonioUSA
  2. 2.Institute for Cyber-Security Research, University of Texas at San AntonioUSA

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