A Practical System for Globally Revoking the Unlinkable Pseudonyms of Unknown Users

  • Stefan Brands
  • Liesje Demuynck
  • Bart De Decker
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4586)

Abstract

We propose the first single sign-on system in which a user can access services using unlinkable digital pseudonyms that can all be revoked in case she abuses any one service. Our solution does not rely on key escrow: a user needs to trust only her own computing device with following our protocols in order to be assured of the unconditional untraceability and unlinkability of her pseudonyms. Our solution involves two novel ingredients: a technique for invisibly chaining the user’s pseudonyms such that all of them can be revoked on the basis of any one of them (without knowing the user’s identity with the issuer) and a sublinear-time proof that a committed value is not on a list without revealing additional information about the value. Our solution is highly practical.

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Copyright information

© Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Brands
    • 1
  • Liesje Demuynck
    • 2
  • Bart De Decker
    • 2
  1. 1.Credentica & McGill School of Comp. Science, 1010 Sherbrooke St. W., Suite 1800, Montreal, QC,H3A 2R7Canada
  2. 2.K.U.Leuven, Department of Computer Science, Celestijnenlaan 200A, B-3001 HeverleeBelgium

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