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Closeness Counts in Social Choice

  • Tommi Meskanen
  • Hannu Nurmi

Abstract

A working democratic system of government is based on voting and elections. A glance at the literature reveals an astonishing variety of systems used for electing persons to political offices, for choosing policy alternatives and for enacting legislation. While it is undoubtedly true that voting is just a necessary condition for democracy, it is remarkable how many and how different systems are used for apparently the same purpose, viz. to find out the ‘will of the people’.

Keywords

Social Choice Goal State Vote System Social Choice Function Approval Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tommi Meskanen
    • 1
  • Hannu Nurmi
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsUniversity of TurkuFinland
  2. 2.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of TurkuFinland

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