Toward a Large Scale E-Market: A Greedy and Local Search Based Winner Determination

  • Naoki Fukuta
  • Takayuki Ito
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4570)

Abstract

Combinatorial auction is one of the most popular market mechanisms and it has a huge effect on electronic markets and political strategies. On large scale e-markets, we need a good approximation algorithm for winner determination that is robust for changing the distribution and the number of bids in an auction. We proposed approximate algorithms for combinatorial auctions with massively large number of (more than 100,000) bids. In this paper, we show the robustness of our winner determination algorithms for combinatorial auctions with large number of bids. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed algorithms are robust on changing the distribution and the number of bids in an auction. Finally, we shortly describe a theoretical limitation about our algorithms that concerns with giving truthfulness of the auction mechanism.

Keywords

E-Commerce and Multi-agent systems 

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Copyright information

© Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Naoki Fukuta
    • 1
  • Takayuki Ito
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of Informatics, Shizuoka University, 3 5 1 Johoku, Hamamatsu, Shizuoka 432-8011Japan
  2. 2.Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya Institute of Technology, Gokiso, Showa-ku, Nagoya, 466-8555Japan

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