Agent Compatibility and Coalition Formation: Investigating Two Interacting Negotiation Strategies

  • Carlos Merida-Campos
  • Steven Willmott
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4452)


This paper focuses on the Coalition Formation paradigm as a market mechanism. Concretely, Coalition Formation occurs as part of a wider open world and may occur many times during the lifetime of a population of agents. This fact can in some circumstances be exploited by agents to re-use existing partial coalition and social relationships over time to improve Coalition Formation efficiency. The aim of the work is to analyze the dynamics of two concrete rational behaviors (Competitive and Conservative strategies) and, in particular, to investigate how agents in a heterogeneous population cluster together across multiple Coalition Formation episodes and varying tasks. Preliminary resuls are also shown regarding the manner in which playing distinct strategies interact with one another.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Arnold, T., Schwalbe, U.: Dynamic coalition formation and the core. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 49, 363–380 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Axtell, R.: The emergence of firms in a population of agents: Local increasing returns, unstable nash equilibria, and power law size distributions. Working Paper 3, Center on Social and Economic Dynamics, Brookings Institution (1999)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Batagelj, V., Mrvar, A.: Pajek-program for large network analysis.
  4. 4.
    Cailou, P., Aknine, S., Pinson, S.: A multi-agent method for forming and dynamic restructuring of pareto optimal coalitions. In: Proceedings of the 1st conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS’02, Bologna, Italy (2002)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Cornforth, D., Kirley, M., Bossomaier, T.: Agent heterogeneity and coalition formation: Investigating market-based cooperative problem solving. In: Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS’04, New York, USA (2004)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Dragulescu, A., Yakovenko, V.M.: Exponential and power-law probability distributions of wealth and income in the united kingdom and the united states. In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, vol. 125, Society for Computational Economics (July 2002)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Gatti, D.D., Guilmi, C.D.: Financial fragility, industrial dynamics and business fluctuations in an agent based model. Paper presented ad the conference Wild@Ace 2003, Turin, Italy, October 3-4 (2003)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Gatti, D.D., et al.: A new approach to business fluctuations: heterogeneous interacting agents, scaling laws and financial fragility (2003)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Klusch, M., Gerber, A.: Dynamic coalition formation among rational agents. IEEE Intelligent Systems 17(3), 42–47 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Konishi, H., Ray, D.: Coalition formation as a dynamic process. Journal of Economic Theory 110, 1–41 (2003)MATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Kraus, S., Shehory, O., Taase, G.: Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information. In: Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS’03, Melbourne, Australia (2003)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Merida-Campos, C., Willmott, S.: Modelling coalition formation over time for iterative coalition games. In: Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS’04, New York, USA (2004)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Smith, V.L.: An experimental study of competitive market behavior. The Journal of Political Economy 70, 111–137 (1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carlos Merida-Campos
    • 1
  • Steven Willmott
    • 1
  1. 1.Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Software Department, E-08034 BarcelonaSpain

Personalised recommendations