Reputation Systems for Anonymous Networks

  • Elli Androulaki
  • Seung Geol Choi
  • Steven M. Bellovin
  • Tal Malkin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5134)

Abstract

We present a reputation scheme for a pseudonymous peer-to-peer (P2P) system in an anonymous network. Misbehavior is one of the biggest problems in pseudonymous P2P systems, where there is little incentive for proper behavior. In our scheme, using ecash for reputation points, the reputation of each user is closely related to his real identity rather than to his current pseudonym. Thus, our scheme allows an honest user to switch to a new pseudonym keeping his good reputation, while hindering a malicious user from erasing his trail of evil deeds with a new pseudonym.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Androulaki, E., Choi, S.G., Bellovin, S.M., Malkin, T.: Reputation systems for anonymous networks. Technical Report CUCS-029-07, Computer Science Dept., Columbia University (2007), http://www.cs.columbia.edu/research/publications
  2. 2.
    Belenkiy, M., Chase, M., Erway, C.C., Jannotti, J., Küpçü, A., Lysyanskaya, A., Rachlin, E.: Making p2p accountable without losing privacy. In: WPES, pp. 31–40 (2007)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Belenkiy, M., Chase, M., Kohlweiss, M., Lysyanskaya, A.: P-signatures and noninteractive anonymous credentials. In: TCC, pp. 356–374 (2008)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bhattacharjee, R., Goel, A.: Avoiding ballot stuffing in ebay-like reputation systems. In: P2PECON, pp. 133–137 (2005)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Camenisch, J., Hohenberger, S., Lysyanskaya, A.: Compact e-cash. In: Cramer, R.J.F. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 302–321. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: An efficient system for non-transferable anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revocation. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 93–118. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Camenisch, J., Stadler, M.: Effcient group signature schemes for large groups. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 410–424. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Commun. ACM 24(2), 84–88 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Danezis, G., Serjantov, A.: Statistical disclosure or intersection attacks on anonymity systems. In: Information Hiding, pp. 293–308 (2004)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., Syverson, P.: Reputation in p2p anonymity systems. In: Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (2003)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., Syverson, P.F.: Tor: The second-generation onion router. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 303–320 (2004)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Gupta, M., Judge, P., Ammar, M.: A reputation system for peer-to-peer networks. In: NOSSDAV (2003)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Johnson, P.C., Kapadia, A., Tsang, P.P., Smith, S.W.: Nymble: Anonymous ip-address blocking. In: Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pp. 113–133 (2007)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Juels, A., Luby, M., Ostrovsky, R.: Security of blind digital signatures (extended abstract). In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 150–164. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Kesdogan, D., Agrawal, D., Pham, V., Rautenbach, D.: Fundamental limits on the anonymity provided by the mix technique. In: S&P, pp. 86–99 (2006)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Kinateder, M., Pearson, S.: A privacy-enhanced peer-to-peer reputation system. In: EC-Web, pp. 206–215 (2003)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Kinateder, M., Rothermel, K.: Architecture and algorithms for a distributed reputation system. In: Nixon, P., Terzis, S. (eds.) iTrust 2003. LNCS, vol. 2692, pp. 1–16. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Kinateder, M., Terdic, R., Rothermel, K.: Strong pseudonymous communication for peer-to-peer reputation systems. In: SAC, pp. 1570–1576 (2005)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Lysyanskaya, A., Rivest, R., Sahai, A., Wolf, S.: Pseudonym systems. In: SAC, pp. 184–199 (1999)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Okamoto, T.: Provably secure and practical identification schemes and corresponding signature schemes. In: Brickell, E.F. (ed.) CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740, pp. 31–53. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Øverlier, L., Syverson, P.F.: Locating hidden servers. In: S&P, pp. 100–114 (2006)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Pavlov, E., Rosenschein, J.S., Topol, Z.: Supporting privacy in decentralized additive reputation systems. In: Jensen, C., Poslad, S., Dimitrakos, T. (eds.) iTrust 2004. LNCS, vol. 2995, pp. 108–119. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Steinbrecher, S.: Design options for privacy-respecting reputation systems within centralised internet communities. In: SEC, pp. 123–134 (2006)Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Syverson, P.F., Goldschlag, D.M., Reed, M.G.: Anonymous connections and onion routing. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 44–54 (1997)Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Voss, M.: Privacy preserving online reputation systems. In: International Information Security Workshops, pp. 245–260 (2004)Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Voss, M., Heinemann, A., Muhlhauser, M.: A privacy preserving reputation system for mobile information dissemination networks. In: SECURECOMM, pp. 171–181 (2005)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elli Androulaki
    • 1
  • Seung Geol Choi
    • 1
  • Steven M. Bellovin
    • 1
  • Tal Malkin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceColumbia University 

Personalised recommendations