Ronald Dworkin and Restricted Legal Interpretation

Chapter 5 analyses an important part of Ronald Dworkin's theory of ‘law as integrity’. Dworkin aims at showing that principles and rights restrict legal interpretation and that this should be the case. In this chapter it is shown that his arguments regarding the existence and utility of these restrictions depend on some highly questionable assumptions. Like descriptions of law they need to be supported by arguments. The absence of convincing arguments for the assumptions makes Dworkin's view on rights as trumps seem more like an assumption than a conclusion.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Dworkin, R. (1963). Judicial discretion. The Journal of Philosophy, 60.Google Scholar
  2. Dworkin, R. (1986). Law's empire. Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
  3. Dworkin, R. (1996). Objectivity and truth. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25:2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
  5. Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The concept of law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  6. Kant, I. (1964). Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals. New York: Harper & Row (with extra page reference to the 2nd German edition.)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Personalised recommendations