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A Proof of Concept Implementation of SSL/TLS Session-Aware User Authentication (TLS-SA)

  • Rolf Oppliger
  • Ralf Hauser
  • David Basin
  • Aldo Rodenhaeuser
  • Bruno Kaiser
Part of the Informatik aktuell book series (INFORMAT)

Abstract

Most SSL/TLS-based e-commerce applications employ conventional mechanisms for user authentication. These mechanisms—if decoupled from SSL/TLS session establishment—are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. In this paper, we elaborate on the feasibility of MITM attacks, survey countermeasures, introduce the notion of SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication (TLS-SA), and present a proof of concept implementation of TLS-SA. We think that TLS-SA fills a gap between the use of public key certificates on the client side and currently deployed user authentication mechanisms. Most importantly, it allows for the continued use of legacy two-factor authentication devices while still providing high levels of protection against MITM attacks.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rolf Oppliger
    • 1
  • Ralf Hauser
    • 2
  • David Basin
    • 3
  • Aldo Rodenhaeuser
    • 4
  • Bruno Kaiser
    • 4
  1. 1.eSECURITY TechnologiesGümligen
  2. 2.PrivaSphere AGZürich
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceETH ZurichZürich
  4. 4.AdNovum Informatik AGZürich

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