Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections

  • Nadja Betzler
  • Jiong Guo
  • Rolf Niedermeier
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5124)

Abstract

We show that, other than for standard complexity theory with known NP-completeness results, the computational complexity of the Dodgson and Young election systems is completely different from a parameterized complexity point of view. That is, on the one hand, we present an efficient fixed-parameter algorithm for determining a Condorcet winner in Dodgson elections by a minimum number of switches in the votes. On the other hand, we prove that the corresponding problem for Young elections, where one has to delete votes instead of performing switches, is W[2]-complete. In addition, we study Dodgson elections that allow ties between the candidates and give fixed-parameter tractability as well as W[2]-hardness results depending on the cost model for switching ties.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nadja Betzler
    • 1
  • Jiong Guo
    • 1
  • Rolf Niedermeier
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für InformatikFriedrich-Schiller-Universität JenaJenaGermany

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