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Federated Identity Management

  • Jan Camenisch
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
Part of the Data-Centric Systems and Applications book series (DCSA)

Abstract

The more real business and interaction with public authorities is performed in digital form, the more important the handling of identities over open networks becomes. The rise in identity theft as a result of the misuse of global but unprotected identifiers like credit card numbers is one strong indicator of this. Setting up individual passwords between a person and every organization he or she interacts with also offers very limited security in practice. Federated identity management addresses this critical issue. Classic proposals like Kerberos and PKIs never gained wide acceptance because of two problems: actual deployment to end users and privacy. We describe modern approaches that solve these problems. The first approach is browser-based protocols, where the user only needs a standard browser without special settings. We discuss the specific protocol types and security challenges of this protocol class, as well as what level of privacy can and cannot be achieved within this class. The second approach, private credentials, solves the problems that none of the prior solutions could solve, but requires the user to install some local software. Private credentials allow the user to reveal only the minimum information necessary to conduct transactions. In particular, it enables unlinkable transactions even for certified attributes. We sketch the cryptographic solutions and describe how optional properties such as revocability can be achieved, in particular in the idemix system.

Keywords

Signature Scheme Commitment Scheme Identity Supplier Security Assertion Markup Language Direct Anonymous Attestation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Camenisch
    • 1
  • Birgit Pfitzmann
    • 1
  1. 1.IBM Zurich Research LaboratorySwitzerland

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