A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice

  • Yann Chevaleyre
  • Ulle Endriss
  • Jérôme Lang
  • Nicolas Maudet
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4362)

Abstract

Computational social choice is an interdisciplinary field of study at the interface of social choice theory and computer science, promoting an exchange of ideas in both directions. On the one hand, it is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, such as complexity analysis or algorithm design, to the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting procedures or fair division algorithms. On the other hand, computational social choice is concerned with importing concepts from social choice theory into computing. For instance, the study of preference aggregation mechanisms is also very relevant to multiagent systems. In this short paper we give a general introduction to computational social choice, by proposing a taxonomy of the issues addressed by this discipline, together with some illustrative examples and an (incomplete) bibliography.

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Copyright information

© Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yann Chevaleyre
    • 1
  • Ulle Endriss
    • 2
  • Jérôme Lang
    • 3
  • Nicolas Maudet
    • 1
  1. 1.LAMSADE, Univ. Paris-DauphineFrance
  2. 2.ILLC, University of AmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.IRIT, Univ. Paul Sabatier and CNRSFrance

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