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Trust-Rated Authentication for Domain-Structured Distributed Systems

  • Ralph Holz
  • Heiko Niedermayer
  • Peter Hauck
  • Georg Carle
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5057)

Abstract

We present an authentication scheme and new protocol for domain-based scenarios with inter-domain authentication. Our protocol is primarily intended for domain-structured Peer-to-Peer systems but is applicable for any domain scenario where clients from different domains wish to authenticate to each other. To this end, we make use of Trusted Third Parties in the form of Domain Authentication Servers in each domain. These act on behalf of their clients, resulting in a four-party protocol. If there is a secure channel between the Domain Authentication Servers, our protocol can provide secure authentication. To address the case where domains do not have a secure channel between them, we extend our scheme with the concept of trust-rating. Domain Authentication Servers signal security-relevant information to their clients (pre-existing secure channel or not, trust, ...). The clients evaluate this information to decide if it fits the security requirements of their application.

Keywords

Authentication Protocols PKI Trust-Rating Multi-Domain Distributed Systems Peer-to-Peer 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ralph Holz
    • 1
  • Heiko Niedermayer
    • 1
  • Peter Hauck
    • 1
  • Georg Carle
    • 1
  1. 1.Wilhelm-Schickard-Institut für InformatikUniversity of TübingenGermany

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