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Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies

  • Elinor Ostrom

A major problem in understanding institutions relates to the complexity and diversity of contemporary life and the resulting specialization that has occurred within the social sciences. The central aim of the social sciences is to explain human behavior. But what kind of human behavior? Within which kinds of institutional settings?

Keywords

Action Situation Institutional Arrangement Institutional Analysis Urban Water System Payoff Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elinor Ostrom
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceIndiana UniversityUSA

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