On a Possible Privacy Flaw in Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA)

  • Adrian Leung
  • Liqun Chen
  • Chris J. Mitchell
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68979-9_14

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4968)
Cite this paper as:
Leung A., Chen L., Mitchell C.J. (2008) On a Possible Privacy Flaw in Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). In: Lipp P., Sadeghi AR., Koch KM. (eds) Trusted Computing - Challenges and Applications. Trust 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4968. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

A possible privacy flaw in the TCG implementation of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol has recently been discovered by Rudolph. This flaw allows a DAA Issuer to covertly include identifying information within DAA Certificates, enabling a colluding DAA Issuer and one or more verifiers to link and uniquely identify users, compromising user privacy and thereby invalidating the key feature provided by DAA . In this paper we argue that, in typical usage scenarios, the weakness identified by Rudolph is not likely to lead to a feasible attack; specifically we argue that the attack is only likely to be feasible if honest DAA signers and verifiers never check the behaviour of issuers. We also suggest possible ways of avoiding the threat posed by Rudolph’s observation.

Keywords

Direct Anonymous Attestation DAA Privacy Trusted Computing 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adrian Leung
    • 1
  • Liqun Chen
    • 2
  • Chris J. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonEghamUK
  2. 2.Hewlett-Packard Laboratories Stoke GiffordUK

Personalised recommendations