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Greek-Turkish Territorial Waters Game

  • Serdar Ş. Güner

Abstract

Unlike the previous contributions to this section on Models of International Negotiations this chapter deals with a concrete and as yet unsolved international conflict, namely, that between Greece and Turkey over the breadth of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. Greece claims that it has the freedom to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles, whereas Turkey has indicated that a Greek extension of territorial waters constitutes a casus belli. Currently, both countries apply the six-mile limit; several crises have occurred over this issue in the past, but the status quo has remained unchanged.

Keywords

Continental Shelf Territorial Water Cuban Missile Crisis Compute Nash Equilibrium Turkish Armed Force 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Serdar Ş. Güner
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of International RelationsBilkent UniversityAnkaraTurkey

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