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Procedural Design for Conflict Resolution

  • Matthias G. Raith

Abstract

Negotiation over conflicting interests and demands involves two separate but interacting dimensions. One dimension is given by the problem, which includes the content and the structure of the negotiation. The other dimension comes with the players, and it characterizes how the game is approached. This perspective offers a broader understanding of the negotiators’ behavior because it allows one to distinguish between the actual actors in negotiation and the role they are playing in the conflict. Consequently, there are two components of bargaining power, which Underdal [27] classifies as structural and behavioral, that have an influence on the negotiated agreement. Since the roles are part of the structure (i.e., the problem), structural bargaining power is what remains when the players of the game are exchanged. To what extent the structure affects the outcome, of course, depends on the players’ individual bargaining skills. However, if negotiators are similar in their skills—a situation one might expect in high-level negotiations—then the outcome of negotiation will be determined by the structure. Moreover, only knowledge of the game allows one to assess how well negotiators play and to appreciate the quality of their agreement—Is it fair? Is it satisfactory? Who won? and so forth. In order to give negotiators advice on how to achieve their desired outcome, one needs an analytical approach that is focused on the game (the problem), while at the same time acknowledging that it is being played by real players (the negotiators), who are interacting with one another in some way.

Keywords

Transfer Payment Bargaining Solution High Bidder Fair Division Negotiation Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthias G. Raith
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics and ManagementOtto-von-Guericke UniversityMagdeburgGermany

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